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anna raggerga e e e e	The state of the s
	Chancellor Adenauer to President Remiser
	BEODY TEXT: FADRC FOI CAREINO. 73.0819
÷	Dear Mr. President
	Thank you very much for your letter of October 14, 1961. I share your
	Thank you very much for your record of the state of the s
	opinion that a frank exchange of views is of utmost importance for the
	-opinion that a train enteres of
	preservation of Western unity. This is especially true in the present critical
	preservation of the both and th
	situation, in which the Soviets are attempting to undermine this unity by a
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	I am grateful to you and Secretary Rusk for having informed me and my
	I am grateful to you and becreatly
	Government about the talks with Mr. Gromyko, and I believe that the time has
	Government about and the drawn from these
	now come for consultation comparing the conclusions to be drawn from these
	non come and and and already axists. In any
	meetings and whether a basis for formal negotiations already exists. In any
	event, there is obviously need for clarification as to whether the three
	event, there is obviously need to the second
	powers who together bear the responsibility for Berlin are in agreement on
	powers who we will be a serviced to the servic
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United States. They withstood all Soviet blandishments to be selected on the provider of their allies - to pursue together with us a policy of re-establishment of the pursue unified in freedom and security, although it was clear to all that concrete success of this policy in the near future could not be expected. We must not disappoint this confidence, and we must also not destroy for the Germans behind the Iron Curtain the last glimmer of hope for liberation from their present fate.

I am very grateful to you for your explanation on the subject of "European security."

I agree with you that a special military status for some European countries or even for the Federal Republic of Gormany alone is unacceptable; that disengagement cannot be considered; and that the efforts toward disarrament must be taken very seriously.

I should be grateful if—through our Ambassador or through whatever channel you may down appropriate—I could have a clarification of your idea that the confrontation in Central Europe could perhaps be reduced. By impression has always been that it is not the confrontation which is dangerous but rather the reduction of confrontation. Korea is a good example. But the experience at the Israeli—Arab border also proves it; almost all the clashes occurred within the demilitarized or neutralized zones and not where the Israelia and Araba confronted each other directly. It would, of course, be an advantage if the number of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe could be reduced. But we all know that the Soviets would

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Like you, I am of the opinion that every effort should be made to settle the problems before us by peaceful and diplomatic means in order to the allow a desperate collision to take place. For this reason I also consider it reaches to continue the talks with the flowist Foreign Minister, and I hope that we will reach agreement in advance on the size and limits of such talks.

The limits are where wital interests are affected. In this connection, I should like to state that the Federal Republic identifies itself completely with the vital interests of the Three Western Powers that must be defended by force if necessary; but not everything outside those interests is negotiable.

This is especially true of the security interests of the Federal Republic which I dealt with in my last letter. It is also true of Berlin's political and constitutional ties with the Federal Republic, without which Berlin is not viable and would soon become a dying city in which there would be nothing left to defend but empty houses.

Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot depart from the basis laid down in the Paris Treaties of 1954 for a common policy on Germany. Meither can she remounce the contractually agreed principle that the Eastern borders of Germany can only be determined in a peace treaty.

Some of these points have been questioned during the last weeks in the discussions of the ambassadorial group. I must confess that I would consider it dangerous if this tendency were to continue in the discussions.

After the catastrophe of the Hitler period and the war, the German people put all their hopes on the West, on the Atlantic Alliance, and especially on the



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counter such a proposal with a demand for a proportionate reduction in the number of Western troops.

present rests on the general MATO agreement that the Bundeswehr, too, will have at its disposal, in case of war, the atomic warheads which in peacetime are in American custody. Inassuch as the Federal Republic of Germany, at the request of her allies, is the only country in the world to have renounced the production of atomic weapons, she must be able to rely on this fundamental basis of MATO policy. Any agreement with the Soviets which encroaches upon or actually vitiates this basis of our defense policy would endanger the security of the Federal Republic of Germany—and thereby also the security of our allies.

For these reasons Mr. Gromyko's demands in this area must, in my opinion, he rejected.

Measures against surprise attacks could be useful, but they can only be significant today in the form of very extensive somes.

I would welcome a personal discussion with you, Mr. President, on all these questions and on the present situation in general, after the formation of our new government, which will probably take place next week.

I shall ensuer your letter of October 19 concerning Mr. Gilpatrick's visit after his arrival here.

With respectful and cordial regards,

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Yours,

(*) Adensuer

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